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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
Katherine E. Ramsey *
Sarah J. Brownlow **
INTRODUCTION
The 2021 Virginia General Assembly did not pass any major
laws governing estates or trusts this year. However, it did pass
several legislative efforts related to the field and of which practitioners should be aware.1 Perhaps the most relevant update given
the COVID-19 pandemic was the Legislature’s effort to modernize
procedures for electronic notarizations and electronic recording of
documents. Another new law was designed to improve retirement
savings participation rates in the Commonwealth by requiring certain employers to enroll their employees by default in a new, statefacilitated individual retirement account program. The Legislature
also passed several bills designed to make it easier for disabled individuals to receive third-party support when making their own
healthcare, financial, and personal decisions. New laws also expanded the class of parents and custodians who can designate a
standby legal guardian for a minor and slightly modified the order
of priority for beneficiaries in a wrongful death suit. Finally, the
Legislature updated the Virginia Stock Corporation Act as it pertains to filing procedures and requirements, shareholder notice requirements, and the ability of directors to take emergency action.
Although these changes were not technically substantive developments in the area of wills, trusts, and estates, attorneys should be
mindful of them when advising their clients in ancillary corporate
matters.

* Member, Virginia Estate & Trust Law, P.L.C., Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1998, University of Virginia; M.S., 1988, Boston University; B.A., 1986, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University.
** Of Counsel, Virginia Estate & Trust Law, P.L.C., Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 2009,
Vanderbilt University Law School; B.B.A., 2004, College of William & Mary.
1. Except where specifically noted, all 2021 legislation summarized in this Article became effective July 1, 2021.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia handed down six reported decisions in the past year, addressing the enforceability of a purchase
option under a will, the standing of disinherited beneficiaries to
challenge inter vivos gifts, the court’s ability to award attorneys’
fees in cases of fraud, and the impact of an out-of-state court’s finding of capacity on a Virginia proceeding that challenged the same
individual’s revocation of a trust.
I. LEGISLATION
A. Recordation of Electronic Documents; Electronic Notarization
Although the 2021 General Assembly did not adopt a potentially
groundbreaking bill that would have authorized the use of electronic wills in Virginia, it did address certain issues with electronic
notarization and the recordation of electronic documents.2 These
changes became effective March 11, 2021.3
Clerks with an e-recording system in place must now accept otherwise valid electronic filings for recordation.4 If the clerk is unable
to record the electronic document, they must record a legible paper
copy instead, provided it (1) otherwise meets the requirements for
recordation and (2) is certified as a true and accurate copy of the
electronic original by the person who is submitting it for recordation.5 The statute includes a form of affidavit for this purpose.6
For electronic notarizations, the notarial certificate must include the county or city in the Commonwealth where the electronic
notary public was physically located at the time of notarization and
indicate whether the notarization was done in person or remotely.7
The legislation also expands the means by which an electronic
notary may confirm the identity of the person whose signature is
2. See H.B. 1856, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2021); S.B. 1435, Va. Gen. Assembly
(Reg. Sess. 2021); Act of Mar. 11, 2021, ch. 78, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 17.1-223, 47.1-2, 47.1-16, 55.1-606 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
3. See ch. 78, 2021 Va. Acts at __.
4. See § 17.1-223(C) (Cum. Supp. 2021). Previously, the statute was silent regarding a
clerk’s duty to accept documents submitted electronically. Cf. id. § 17.1-223(C) (Repl. Vol.
2015).
5. Id. § 17.1-223(C) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
6. See id.
7. Id. § 47.1-16(A) (Cum. Supp. 2021); see also id. § 47.1-2 (Cum. Supp. 2021) (defining
“electronic notarial certificate”).
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being notarized.8 Previously, the electronic notary was required to
confirm the person’s identity through personal knowledge, a prior
in-person identity-proofing process, or a valid digital certificate accessed by biometric data or similar means.9 Now, the oath or affirmation of a credible witness is also an acceptable independent
means for confirming the party’s identity.10 However, unless the
electronic notary personally knows the person or a credible witness
has sworn to their identity, the person’s identity must be confirmed
through at least two of the following methods: (1) credential analysis (that is, a process that independently affirms the veracity) of
a government-issued photo identification with the person’s signature, (2) “identity proofing” through a previous in-person process
or other approved means, and (3) a valid digital certificate accessed
by biometric data or similar means.11
If a document appears on its face to have been properly notarized, whether electronically or not, the clerk must accept it for recordation if it otherwise meets the recording requirements.12 Prior
to the 2021 update, the clerk had discretion to reject any document
submitted for recordation.13 Any clerk who records a copy of a document that has been electronically notarized pursuant to the statute is protected from liability unless they were grossly negligent or
engaged in willful misconduct in doing so.14
B. Virginia IRA Savings Program
Beginning July 1, 2023, Virginia will facilitate a new retirement
savings program through the governing board of the Virginia College Savings Plan.15 The program’s goal is to spur self-employed
individuals and employees of small and mid-sized enterprises who
may not have access to an employer-sponsored plan to save more
for their own retirement.16

8. See id. § 47.1-2 (Cum. Supp. 2021) (defining “satisfactory evidence of identity”).
9. See id. § 47.1-2 (Repl. Vol. 2020).
10. Id. § 47.1-2 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
11. Id.
12. Id. § 17.1-223(D) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
13. Cf. id. § 17.1-223(C) (Repl. Vol. 2020).
14. Id. § 55.1-606 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
15. Act of Apr. 15, 2021, ch. 556, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified at §§ 2.2-2744 to -2757,
and as amended at § 23.1-701(E) (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
16. See § 2.2-2745 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
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The statute creates several new defined terms.17 An “eligible employer” is any private-sector employer in Virginia that (1) has
twenty-five or more eligible employees for all four quarters of the
preceding calendar year, (2) has been operating for at least two
years, and (3) does not otherwise offer a qualified retirement plan
to its employees.18 An “eligible employee” must be at least eighteen
years old, currently working at least thirty hours per week, and
receiving wages.19
Under the new rules, all eligible employers must enroll their eligible employees in the IRA savings program and arrange for their
individual contributions to be deposited directly to their IRA account, unless the employee elects not to participate.20 Non-eligible
employers may also choose to help their eligible employees participate in the program, but are cautioned against accidentally creating an ERISA-covered employee benefit plan if they do.21 Self-employed individuals with Virginia taxable income, or eligible
employees of non-participating employers, will also be allowed to
join the program on their own.22
A participating employee may terminate their participation in
the program at any time.23 Similarly, a participating employer may
always set up a separate retirement plan for its employees, in
which case it will no longer be eligible to participate in the program.24
The state-facilitated program will be administered by the Board
of the Virginia College Savings Plan (“Board”) with the assistance
of one or more committees, including a Program Advisory Committee.25 The members of the Program Advisory Committee must have
extensive experience in retirement plan design, retirement plan investments, domestic or international equity or fixed-income

17. See id. § 2.2-2744 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
18. Id.
19. Id. To be eligible, the employee must have Virginia taxable income. See id. § 2.22751(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
20. See id. § 2.2-2751(D)–(E) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
21. Id. § 2.2-2751(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
22. Id. § 2.2-2751(A)(2)–(3) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
23. Id. § 2.2-2751(F) (Cum. Supp. 2021). Presumably a self-employed individual may
also voluntarily withdraw from the program, but the statute only addresses termination by
a “participating employee,” which is defined as including only an “eligible employee.” See id.
§§ 2.2-2744, -2751(F) (Cum. Supp. 2021); see also id. § 2.2-2751(A)(2)–(3) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
24. Id. § 2.2-2751(K) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
25. Id. § 2.2-2746(A), (H) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
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securities, cash management, alternative investments, institutional real estate investments, or managed futures.26
All employee contributions will be held in a segregated trust
fund.27 In addition to establishing enrollment and other procedures, the Board will control all investments and set default contribution rates.28 Other state agencies are expressly authorized to
share relevant information with the Board, unless otherwise prohibited.29
The legislation protects employers from liability in connection
with the program.30 The Commonwealth, the Virginia College Savings Plan, and its Board members are also generally protected
against any claims relating to the payment of benefits under the
program.31
C. Informal Support for Disabled Individuals
Many disabled individuals depend upon the assistance of family
members, friends, or other trusted people to help them navigate
through the healthcare system and deal with their finances. In
such cases, the individual may not have (or even need) a legal
guardian or conservator because they are capable of understanding
the facts and making their own decisions when the information is
presented clearly and they are given time to process it. However,
third parties are not always comfortable with having another person in the room. Safety concerns related to the COVID-19 pandemic also exacerbated the issue. The 2021 General Assembly addressed the problem through two new statutes.32
1. Designated Support Persons
Inpatient hospitals (other than long-term acute care or specialty
rehabilitation hospitals), outpatient surgical hospitals, hospice facilities, and certain state-owned or operated hospitals and nursing
26. Id. § 2.2-2746(C) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
27. Id. § 2.2-2752 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
28. Id. § 2.2-2747 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
29. Id. § 2.2-2748 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
30. Id. § 2.2-2751(G)–(I) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
31. See id. §§ 2.2-2749, -2755, -2756 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
32. See Act of Mar. 18, 2021, ch. 220, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified at § 32.1-137.08
(Cum. Supp. 2021)); Act of Mar. 18, 2021, ch. 232, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified at § 37.2314.3, and codified as amended at §§ 64.2-2000, -2003, -2007 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
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homes must allow disabled individuals needing assistance as a result of their disability to be accompanied by a designated support
person while admitted.33 To qualify for the additional support, the
disabled person must have (or have a record of having) a physical,
sensory, mental or emotional impairment prior to admission that
substantially limits one or more activities of daily living, such as
bathing, dressing, toileting, transferring, or eating.34
The designated support person’s role is to support and assist the
disabled individual during their stay at the medical care facility.35
This may include assistance with activities of daily living, communication, and decision-making, but only if the assistance is ongoing
and (1) actually provided by the designated support person and (2)
is necessary for the disabled individual’s care or to ensure the individual has access to meaningful healthcare.36
The “designated support person” may be any adult who is knowledgeable about the disabled person’s needs.37 The designation may
be made either orally or in writing by the disabled person or their
guardian, authorized representative, or care provider.38 If the disabled person is admitted for more than twenty-four hours, they
may have more than one designated support person, but the medical care facility may limit the number present at any time.39 Designated support persons are not subject to visitation restrictions,
but must follow all other reasonable rules and restrictions.40
The presence of a designated support person does not relieve a
medical care facility from its obligation to provide patients with
effective communication support or other required services under
state or federal law and regulations.41 The law also does not require
the facility to allow a designated support person to do anything
that might pose a danger to the disabled individual, other patients,
visitors, or staff.42

33. See § 32.1-137.08(A)–(B) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
34. Id.
35. See id. § 32.1-137.08(B) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
36. See id. § 32.1-137.08(A) (Cum. Supp. 2021) (defining “support and assistance necessary due to the specifics of the person’s disability”).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. § 32.1-137.08(B) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
40. See id. § 32.1-137.08(C) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
41. Id. § 32.1-137.08(G) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
42. Id. § 32.1-137.08(H) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
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Due to the state of emergency in effect as a result of the COVID19 virus, the new statute became effective on March 18, 2021.43
2. Supported Decision-Making
New Virginia Code section 37.2-314.3 directs the Virginia Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services to educate individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities,
their families, and others about the use of supported decision-making agreements to ensure the disabled individual’s wishes and decisions are carried out.44
A “supported decision-making agreement” is an agreement between any adult with an intellectual or developmental disability
and a third party (the “supporter”).45 The agreement must set out
the specific terms of support to be provided by the supporter.46 Examples of support that might be addressed include: (1) helping the
disabled person monitor and manage their medical, financial, and
other affairs; (2) assisting the disabled person in accessing, obtaining, and understanding information relevant to decisions regarding their affairs; (3) assisting the disabled person in understanding
information, options, responsibilities, and consequences of decisions; or (4) communicating the disabled person’s wishes and decisions regarding their affairs to others and then working to ensure
they are carried out.47
As part of its charge, the Department of Behavioral Health and
Developmental Service will (1) provide educational and training
programs for interested parties on the use of supported decisionmaking agreements; (2) develop model agreements; and (3) establish protocols for preventing, identifying, and addressing abuse
and exploitation of any disabled person who enters into a supported decision-making agreement.48
The statute also directs courts and guardians ad litem in guardianship or conservatorship proceedings to consider whether a

43. Act of Mar. 18, 2021, ch. 220, 2021 Va. Acts __, __, para. 2 (codified as amended at
§ 32.1-137.08 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
44. See § 37.2-314.3(A)–(B) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
45. Id. § 37.2-314.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. § 37.2-314.3(B) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
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supported decision-making arrangement would be a viable alternative.49
D. Standby Guardianships
Since 1998, parents and others with legal physical custody of a
minor child who had been diagnosed with a progressive or chronic
condition could designate a guardian who would take over responsibility for the child in the event the parent became incompetent or
died.50 The 2021 General Assembly expanded the reach of the statute to allow a parent or other person with physical custody of a
minor child to name a standby guardian if the parent or custodian
is facing possible detention, incarceration, or deportation connected to an immigration action.51
E. Wrongful Death Beneficiaries
In 2019, the wrongful death statute was amended to add parents
who regularly received certain support or services from the decedent to the first class of statutory beneficiaries who, along with the
decedent’s surviving spouse and children (or the children of a deceased child), could receive a share of any damages awarded in a
wrongful death suit.52 The Virginia Legislature modified the statute slightly in 2021 to give priority to a supported parent only if
there is also a surviving spouse or child (or grandchild).53 Otherwise, the supported parent remains part of the second class of beneficiaries, which includes the decedent’s other parents, siblings,
and other related household members who were dependent on the
decedent for support or services.54

49. Id. §§ 64.2-2003(B), -2007(C) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
50. See Act of Apr. 22, 1998, ch. 829, 1998 Va. Acts, 2020, 2028 (codified at §§ 16.1-349,
-355, and codified as amended at § 16.1-241 (Cum. Supp. 1998)).
51. Act of Mar. 18, 2021, ch. 241, 2021 Va. Acts, __, __ (codified as amended at §§ 16.1349 to -353 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
52. Act of Feb. 19, 2019, ch. 47, 2019 Va. Acts, 52, 52–53 (codified as amended § 8.0153(A)(i) (Cum. Supp. 2019)). For a discussion of the 2019 legislation, see J. William Gray,
Jr. & Katherine E. Ramsey, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 54
U. RICH. L. REV. 183, 190–91 (2019).
53. Act of Mar. 31, 2021, ch. 488, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at § 8.0153(A)(i) (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
54. See § 8.01-53(A)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
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F. Virginia Stock Corporations
The General Assembly substantially modernized the Virginia
Stock Corporation Act in 2019.55 In 2021, the Act was further
changed, inter alia, to bring many of its provisions governing State
Corporation Commission (“SCC”) filing procedures and requirements into alignment with those applicable to other types of entities.56 Notably, the 2021 update also modifies shareholder notice
requirements and the ability of directors to act in an emergency,
such as the COVID-19 pandemic.57 Although a full discussion of
these changes is best left to the corporate attorneys, trusts and estates practitioners are cautioned to check the statute for any relevant changes before filing documents with the SCC or otherwise
handling ancillary corporate legal matters for their clients.
II. CASES
A. Enforceability of Purchase Option in Will
In Wilburn v. Mangano, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered, as a matter of first impression, whether the terms of an option granted under a will and codicil were certain enough to create
an enforceable contract.58
The decedent’s will and codicil left her residence to her three
daughters, but gave her son (Anthony) the option, exercisable for
one year from the date the will was probated, to purchase the property from his sisters for a price “equal to the fair market value at
the time of my death.”59 After Anthony timely exercised his option,
his sisters obtained two appraisals: one for $311,000 and one for
$270,000.60 At this point, it appears Anthony had cold feet, and the
sisters filed suit to compel him to purchase the home for the average of the two appraised values, or $290,500.61 They later amended
their complaint to ask the court to compel their brother to purchase
55. For a discussion of the 2019 legislation, see Laurence V. Parker, Jr., Annual Survey
of Virginia Law: Corporate and Business Law, 54 U. RICH. L. REV. 73, 75–85 (2019).
56. Act of Mar. 31, 2021, ch. 487, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended in scattered
sections of VA. CODE ANN. tits. 13.1, 15.2, 50 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
57. See §§ 13.1-610(E), -625(D), -628(C) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
58. 299 Va. 348, 350, 354, 851 S.E.2d 474, 475, 477 (2020).
59. See id. at 350–51, 851 S.E.2d at 475.
60. See id. at 351, 851 S.E.2d at 475.
61. See id. at 351, 851 S.E.2d at 475.
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the property for the higher price of $311,000.62 Anthony responded
by arguing there was no enforceable purchase contract because
“fair market value at the date of [his mother’s] death” was not a
sufficiently specific term to establish mutual assent to the purchase price.63
At trial, the Northumberland County Circuit Court agreed with
Anthony, holding that the testamentary language was too vague to
establish a meeting of the minds regarding the purchase price because it lacked any method for determining the property’s fair market value.64 The circuit court suggested that the decedent might
have believed her children would agree on the method for determining the actual price once the option was exercised.65
On appeal, the supreme court upheld the circuit court’s decision,
restating the well-established rule that a contract relating to the
sale of land will not be specifically enforced if it is incomplete, uncertain, or indefinite in its material terms.66 Because price is a material term, the Court said it must be fixed by the agreement itself
or else the agreement must provide a method for determining it
with certainty.67
Although the decedent’s will appeared to establish a price for the
property equal to its “fair market value at the time of [her] death,”
the Court explained that “fair market value” meant only the price
on which a willing buyer and willing seller would agree in an arm’slength transaction on the open market.68 Therefore, without more
specific language, the decedent’s will did no more than grant Anthony the option to purchase the property at a price he was willing
to pay and his sisters were willing to accept.69

62. See id. at 351, 851 S.E.2d at 475.
63. Id. at 351–52, 851 S.E.2d at 475.
64. See id. at 352, 851 S.E.2d at 475–76.
65. See id. at 352, 851 S.E.2d at 476.
66. See id. at 353, 356, 851 S.E.2d at 476, 478 (citing Parker v. Murphy, 152 Va. 173,
183, 146 S.E. 254, 257 (1929); and then citing Duke v. Tobin, 198 Va. 758, 759, 96 S.E.2d
758, 760 (1957)).
67. See id. at 353, 851 S.E.2d at 476–77 (citing Parker, 152 Va. at 184, 146 S.E. at 257–
58).
68. See id. at 351, 354–55, 851 S.E.2d at 475, 477.
69. See id. at 355, 851 S.E.2d at 477.
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B. Standing to Challenge Decedent’s Lifetime Gifts
Platt v. Griffith confirmed that a personal representative is the
only person who has standing to sue on behalf of the estate and its
beneficiaries to set aside lifetime gifts made by the decedent.70
The decedent (Dr. Griffith) made a will in 2010 by which he left
his estate to his second wife and his son, except for two twenty-acre
parcels of farmland for his two daughters (the plaintiffs).71 In the
years that followed, the testator executed two deeds of gift, one of
which transferred all of his personal property to his wife and the
other of which gave his wife a life estate in the farm with the remainder to his son.72 As a result of these transfers, the two daughters were effectively disinherited.73
After their father’s death, the disappointed daughters unsuccessfully challenged the validity of his 2010 will.74 They then
brought suit against their brother and stepmother for, inter alia,
breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and undue influence.75 They
asked the court to place their father’s assets in a constructive trust
and to declare the inter vivos transfers void.76
The Henrico County Circuit Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds that the daughters lacked standing,
holding that only Dr. Griffith’s son, as personal representative,
could bring such claims.77 The circuit court held that the daughters
had no right, title, or interest in their father’s estate because the
2010 will extinguished any expectation they may have had as to
his personal property, while the decedent had transferred the farm
to his wife and son before his death.78
On appeal, the supreme court upheld the circuit court’s ruling,
finding that the daughters could not show an “immediate, pecuniary, and substantial interest in the litigation.”79 The Court

70. 299 Va. 388, 391, 853 S.E.2d 63, 65 (2021).
71. See id. at 388, 853 S.E.2d at 63.
72. See id. at 388–89, 853 S.E.2d at 63–64.
73. See id. at 389, 853 S.E.2d at 64.
74. See id. at 388–89, 853 S.E.2d at 63–64.
75. See id. at 388–89, 853 S.E.2d at 63–64.
76. See id. at 389, 853 S.E.2d at 64.
77. See id. at 389–90, 853 S.E.2d at 64.
78. See id. at 390, 853 S.E.2d at 64.
79. See id. at 390, 853 S.E.2d at 64–65 (quoting Westlake Props., Inc. v. Westlake Pointe
Prop. Owners Ass’n, 273 Va. 107, 120, 639 S.E.2d 257, 265 (2007)).
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confirmed that only the personal representative may litigate
claims belonging to the decedent on behalf of the estate, even when
the personal representative is also a possible beneficiary of the estate.80 Although the plaintiffs tried to argue for standing based on
their own “vested” interest in the land under the 2010 will, the
Court disagreed, finding that the plaintiffs did not have a vested
property interest and their claims for rescission of the lifetime gifts
were inherently on behalf of the estate.81 The Court suggested that
even when the claims relate to the personal representative’s own
alleged misconduct, the beneficiaries’ only course of action is to
seek to have the personal representative removed and replaced.82
C. Award of Attorney Fees in Fraud Case
Even attorneys who do not handle litigation are familiar with
the so-called “American Rule,” which generally requires parties to
pay their own attorneys’ fees absent a contractual or statutory provision to the contrary.83 However, as St. John v. Thompson showed,
the rule is not without its exceptions.84 In St. John, the Supreme
Court of Virginia considered whether the “American Rule” should
apply to deny an award of attorneys’ fees against a defendant who
was found to have defrauded a neighbor into transferring assets to
a trust for his benefit.85
The facts involved a gentleman (Mr. Elsea) who had a limited
education, below average intellectual abilities, poor sight and hearing, and poor health, which together left him with cognitive deficits
and a fear that his family would take his property and place him
in a nursing home.86 Elsea was the beneficiary of several trusts and
owned a gun collection worth almost $100,000.87
In 2015, Elsea was befriended by a new neighbor, Mr. St. John.88
The neighbor convinced Elsea to (1) transfer his firearms and other
assets into a gun trust controlled by St. John, (2) sign a durable
80. See id. at 390, 853 S.E.2d at 65 (citing Reineck v. Lemen, 292 Va. 710, 722, 792
S.E.2d 269, 275 (2016)).
81. See id. at 390–91, 853 S.E.2d at 64–65.
82. See id. at 391, 853 S.E.2d at 65.
83. See, e.g., Prospect Dev. Co. v. Bershader, 258 Va. 75, 92, 515 S.E.2d 291, 300 (1999).
84. See generally 299 Va. 431, 854 S.E.2d 648 (2021).
85. Id. at 432, 854 S.E.2d at 649.
86. See id. at 433, 854 S.E.2d at 650.
87. See id. at 433, 854 S.E.2d at 650.
88. See id. at 433, 854 S.E.2d at 650.
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power of attorney naming St. John as his agent, (3) fire his estate
planning attorney, and (4) execute new estate planning documents
that benefited St. John and his partner.89 After St. John moved
away, Elsea revoked the power of attorney and demanded he return the guns, which St. John refused to do.90
At trial, the Clarke County Circuit Court found that St. John
had committed fraud and ordered him to return the weapons to
Elsea or else pay him their value.91 In addition, the circuit court
ordered St. John to pay over $100,000 of Elsea’s attorney fees.92
The supreme court upheld the circuit court’s decision, explaining
that the “American Rule” regarding attorney fees was subject to an
equitable exception in abusive or egregious cases.93 Specifically, in
cases of fraud, a court may award attorneys’ fees to the defrauded
party after considering the circumstances surrounding the fraudulent acts.94 The Court rejected St. John’s argument that the exception applied only in particularly egregious cases of fraud, finding
that the equitable relief may be given at the court’s discretion.95
D. Collateral Estoppel as Applied to Settlor’s Capacity
The Supreme Court of Virginia considered in Plofchan v.
Plofchan whether the plaintiff fiduciaries were collaterally estopped from arguing in a Virginia court that the defendant was
incapacitated with respect to financial matters and therefore could
not revoke her Virginia trust, after another state’s court had found
that she was not incapacitated in the context of a legal guardianship proceeding.96
Thomas Plofchan began serving as his mother’s attorney-in-fact
in 2001.97 In 2006, Ms. Plofchan created a revocable trust governed
by Virginia law.98 She named herself as the sole trustee and reserved the right as grantor to amend or revoke the trust without

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See id. at 433, 854 S.E.2d at 650.
See id. at 433–34, 854 S.E.2d at 650.
See id. at 434, 854 S.E.2d at 650.
See id. at 434, 854 S.E.2d at 650.
See id. at 434–35, 854 S.E.2d at 650–51.
See id. at 435, 854 S.E.2d at 651.
See id. at 432, 435, 854 S.E.2d at 650–51.
See generally 299 Va. 534, 855 S.E.2d 857 (2021).
Id. at 538, 855 S.E.2d at 859.
See id. at 538, 855 S.E.2d at 860.
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the consent of the trustee or any other person.99 Ms. Plofchan
moved to New York in 2013 to live with her daughter, and shortly
thereafter she was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease.100 In 2016,
Ms. Plofchan resigned as trustee of her trust, and named Thomas
and another child as successor cotrustees.101 Shortly thereafter,
two doctors signed certificates of incapacity stating that Ms.
Plofchan was deemed incapacitated pursuant to the terms of the
trust agreement.102
Two years later, Ms. Plofchan signed a document revoking
Thomas’s power of attorney and asked a New York court to appoint
her daughter as her guardian and terminate all authority she had
previously granted to the cotrustees of her revocable trust.103 As
part of that proceeding, the two doctors who had previously signed
certificates of incapacity revoked them, stating that Ms. Plofchan
had “a broad understanding of her finances.”104 Shortly thereafter,
Ms. Plofchan notified her children that she had also revoked her
trust.105
Meanwhile, in the New York guardianship proceeding, the court
found that Ms. Plofchan was not an incapacitated person within
the meaning of the applicable New York statute and, apparently
without being aware of Ms. Plofchan’s revocation of the power of
attorney and trust, that those two documents obviated the need for
a guardian.106 Shortly thereafter, the trustees filed a complaint in
Virginia alleging that their mother was incapacitated as it related
to financial matters, that the revocation of her power of attorney
and trust were ineffective, and that she had taken certain actions
to frustrate the administration of the trust and cut off their access
to her trust accounts and personal accounts.107 The trustees asked
the Virginia court to prevent Ms. Plofchan from wasting the trust
assets and interfering with their administration of the trust.108

99. See id. at 538, 855 S.E.2d at 860.
100. See id. at 538, 855 S.E.2d at 860.
101. Id. at 538, 855 S.E.2d at 860.
102. Id. at 539, 855 S.E.2d at 860.
103. See id. at 539, 855 S.E.2d at 860.
104. See id. at 539, 855 S.E.2d at 860.
105. See id. at 540, 855 S.E.2d at 860–61.
106. See id. at 540–41, 855 S.E.2d at 861.
107. See id. at 541, 855 S.E.2d at 861.
108. See id. at 541, 855 S.E.2d at 861.
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Ms. Plofchan argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing because
she had previously revoked the power of attorney and trust, and
that the New York court’s decision collaterally estopped them from
bringing a suit in Virginia to deem her incapacitated.109 The Fairfax County Circuit Court agreed and dismissed the case with prejudice, but did not elaborate on its ruling.110
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and remanded the
case.111 The Court ruled that the New York court’s determination
that Ms. Plofchan was not an incapacitated person and could manage her own affairs addressed a different question than the one in
the Virginia proceeding, which was whether Ms. Plofchan had
mental capacity on the dates she signed the revocation of the power
of attorney and trust.112 In addition to the different standards under different state laws and different situations, the Court explained that the key inquiry in the Virginia case was whether Ms.
Plofchan had mental capacity at the time she signed the revocation
instruments, not at the time of the New York guardianship proceeding.113
CONCLUSION
This year the General Assembly refrained from making significant changes in Virginia law governing estates and trusts. It did,
however, provide helpful new rules as to the notarization and recording of electronic documents. The Legislature also created a
state-facilitated retirement savings program, modified the priority
among the beneficiaries of a wrongful death award, expanded the
availability of standby guardianship designations, provided additional support to disabled individuals in healthcare and other settings, and made several additional updates to the recently modified Virginia Stock Corporation Act.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Virginia did not blaze many
new trails. However, its Wilburn decision served as a reminder to
drafters of estate planning documents of the need to specify how a
purchase price is to be determined, and its Platt decision confirmed
that only a decedent’s personal representative may pursue claims
109. See id. at 542, 855 S.E.2d at 862.
110. See id. at 542, 855 S.E.2d at 862.
111. See id. at 549, 855 S.E.2d at 866.
112. See id. at 544–46, 855 S.E.2d at 863–64.
113. See id. at 546, 855 S.E.2d at 864.
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on behalf of the estate. Similarly, the St. John case highlighted the
“fraud” exception to the well-known American Rule regarding attorneys’ fees in Virginia. Lastly, Plofchan illustrated the distinction to be made between the mental capacity standard for a guardianship proceeding versus the determination of testamentary or
contract capacity.

